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ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MANAGING  
CORPORATE LEGITIMACY IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS –  
A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY OF PUMA 
 
ABSTRACT  
Corporations are operating in complex business environments. The globalization of markets 
has transformed the division of labor between governments and corporations and today, cor-
porations are expected to take over a political role in global governance processes and provide 
public goods such as standards for safe work places or environmental protection. Corpora-
tions that assume economic and political responsibilities are, however, confronted with heter-
ogeneous, often contradictory, demands of a highly diverse range of stakeholders. Managing 
these demands poses new organizational challenges for the corporation. In this paper, we ex-
plore how corporations respond to complex stakeholder environments and we analyze the 
legitimacy strategies that corporations employ to maintain their license to operate. In particu-
lar, we study the organizational prerequisites for managing legitimacy and how they are 
changing over time. We draw on the literature on institutional theory and organizational para-
doxes and conduct an empirical case study at the sportswear manufacturer PUMA. The results 
of our qualitative longitudinal study show that managing corporate legitimacy is a dynamic 
concept and corporations learn over time to adequately adapt organizational capacities, struc-
tures and procedures. Based on the findings of our explorative case study, we conclude our 
article by formulating testable hypothesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of corporate legitimacy, the social acceptance of corporate practices (Ashford 
and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), has gained relevance in organizational theory and practice 
in recent years. It is regarded as a critical resource for the survival of a corporation since it 
constitutes a precondition for the continuous flow of resources and for securing the sustained 
support of the organization’s constituencies (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Since corpora-
tions are increasingly organized in multinational networks, they are confronted with highly 
complex social and environmental problems along their business operations which challenge 
their legitimacy (Chandler and Mazlish, 2005; Kobrin, 2001). 
The sportswear manufacturer Nike, for example, operates in a highly heterogeneous legal and 
moral environment. Production takes place in approx. 600 factories in almost 50 countries. 
The company went through a major crisis in the 1990s, after a series of public relations 
nightmares – involving underpaid workers in Indonesia, child labor in Cambodia and Paki-
stan, and poor working conditions in China (Locke, 2002). These incidences triggered con-
sumer boycotts and gave rise to the anti-sweatshop movement at US universities and else-
where. These newly formed stakeholder groups pressured Nike to work towards creating fair-
er working conditions in its global supply chain. Inadequate regulation and monitoring in 
many of the production countries made it difficult, however, to follow-up on these demands 
(Locke, 2002). Nevertheless, given the expectations of Nike’s shareholders to further reduce 
production costs, the company had no other option but to continue sourcing from low-cost 
countries and to address the concerns of labor activists (Levy, 2005). The company had to 
learn to reconcile contradicting stakeholder demands and this learning process also required a 
number of organizational adjustments (Locke, 2002; Zadek, 2004). For example, while the 
company was initially not prepared to handle the criticism (Nike managers sought to ignore 
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and/or deflect criticism), the company today employs over 100 staff that work on ensuring 
fairness in Nike’s supply chain (Zadek, 2004). The literature that documents this organiza-
tional change process is not focused on the management of corporate legitimacy and falls 
short of a detailed analysis of the organizational adjustment process (see Zadek, 2004).  
The analysis of the corporate responses and their organizational implications is critical in the 
context of legitimacy (Oliver, 1996) because corporations need to develop and foster struc-
tures and procedures that serve as sensitive antennas for conflicting stakeholder demands. 
Empirical studies on corporate response strategies to environmental demands, their organiza-
tional implications and their influence on the perception of corporate legitimacy in complex 
and heterogeneous environments are currently lacking (see, e.g. Greenwood et al., 2011). The 
objective of this paper is to fill this research gap and to explore how corporations maintain 
their legitimacy and respond to heterogeneous and often contradictory demands by applying 
and balancing different legitimacy strategies at the same time.  
We employ the insights from recent research streams in organization theory, such as organiza-
tional paradox (Smith and Lewis, 2011), organizational fluidity (Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2010), and organizational ambidexterity (Raisch et al., 2009) to guide our research on manag-
ing legitimacy. We use the term organizational paradox literature as an umbrella term. Alt-
hough authors from this particular literature are not explicitly focusing on legitimacy, we ar-
gue that their insights are useful for conceptualizing empirical case studies on legitimacy 
management and the organizational responses to complex institutional demands (Greenwood 
et al., 2011). We analyze the response strategies and their organizational implications of the 
German sportswear manufacturer Puma, a company that is operating in a particularly chal-
lenging stakeholder environment. The longitudinal analysis of qualitative data from 2003 and 
2011 allows us to track the development of Puma’s response strategies and the organizational 
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learning process over time. Based on the theoretical insights and the evidence from the empir-
ical case study we suggest that (1) corporations employ different legitimation strategies at the 
same time, (2) corporations learn over time to activate the most appropriate response strategy, 
(3) corporations create the organizational prerequisites for effectively managing corporate 
legitimacy, and (4) leadership and open communication channels are critical for building the 
organizational capacities to manage corporate legitimacy.  
The paper has the following structure. In the first part, we elaborate on the theoretical con-
cepts and identify the organizational elements that are critical for managing corporate legiti-
macy. In the second part, we describe the research methodology that we use to analyze corpo-
rate response strategies. In part three we outline our empirical results and summarize our find-
ings. In the final part, we discuss our research contribution and conclude with suggestions for 
further research. 
THEORETICAL INSIGHTS - COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS AND CORPORATE 
RESPONSE STRATEGIES TO LEGITIMACY CHALLENGES 
Managing Organizational Legitimacy in Complex Stakeholder Environments  
Corporations are considered legitimate when their organizational practices correspond with 
the social expectations of their environment (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). If social actors perceive a mismatch between the corporation’s behavior and 
societal expectations, the legitimacy of the corporation is disputed, as illustrated by the exam-
ple of Nike. Today, multinational corporations are facing growing societal expectations (Kaul 
et al., 2003) which connect more stakeholders with diverse interests to the process of corpo-
rate decision-making (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012). For instance, 
inherent tensions exist between stakeholder groups that argue for compliance with social 
standards in global production activities (e.g. labor rights activists) versus groups that are in 
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favor of reducing production costs or creating financial value (e.g. investors). In this context, 
creating a so-called “win-win” solution that leaves both groups better off is difficult to 
achieve and hence satisfying all stakeholder groups equally is not always possible. Corpora-
tions are thus facing a dilemma: satisfying one demand may require violating others, thus po-
tentially jeopardizing organizational legitimacy (Pache and Santos, 2010). We suggest that in 
their quest to maintain their legitimacy, corporations must therefore activate various legitima-
tion strategies in order to balance such paradoxical, incompatible demands. 
Suchman (1995) describes three forms of legitimacy (cognitive: social acceptance based on 
unconscious taken-for-grantedness; pragmatic: social acceptance based on perceived benefit; 
and moral: social acceptance as a result of an explicit discourse) and outlines three corre-
sponding legitimation strategies:  adaptation of organizational practices to social expectation, 
manipulation of expectations and perceptions of relevant stakeholders, and argumentation in 
moral discourse in order to develop new common solutions. Which legitimation strategy is 
appropriate in a given environmental context, however, remains unclear in Suchman’s con-
ceptualization (see Scherer et al., 2013). Under conditions of comparably low complexity, the 
successful management of legitimacy by either passive isomorphic adaptation or by active 
strategic manipulation of social expectations was regarded as one of the preconditions for the 
survival of organizations (Oliver, 1991). With increasing environmental complexity in a glob-
al economy, Palazzo and Scherer (2006) suggest that corporations also have to engage in ar-
gumentation strategies in order to maintain their legitimacy. However, the organizational pre-
requisites of the legitimation strategies (and their potential combinations) have not yet been 
explored (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012). With increasingly heterogeneous expectations, corpora-
tions face a dilemma: satisfying one stakeholder group (by adaptation or manipulation) will 
not satisfy others, and corporations hence risk that their legitimacy is being challenged by less 
satisfied groups, once a particular legitimacy strategy is chosen (Pasche and Santos, 2010: 
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463). It has been argued that under the condition of high heterogeneity with regards to societal 
expectations, the strategy of argumentation through discourse with stakeholders becomes 
more important (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). From a longitudinal perspective, we expect the 
strategy of argumentation to be of growing importance given the increasing heterogeneity of 
corporate environments. Scherer et al. (2013), however, also point out that corporations do 
not have the time and the resources to engage in argumentation in every instance as discours-
es with stakeholders are costly. Apparently, the various legitimacy strategies have their own 
limitations. The adaptation to any kind of external expectations might not be useful and the 
manipulation of stakeholder expectations might not be possible. We assume that corporations 
will draw on several legitimation strategies in parallel despite of the (latent) conflict between 
them. This, however, requires the ability to activate multiple legitimacy strategies simultane-
ously and to understand, which strategy is the most appropriate in a given context. This im-
plies that corporations need to build the necessary organizational capacities to evaluate and 
chose the different legitimacy strategies and to implement them in parallel. 
Organizational Implications of Managing Legitimacy 
Typically, stakeholders ascribe legitimacy to organizations in their entirety. Yet, the failure of 
any subsystem within the organization (e.g. procurement or public affairs) can cause changes 
in public perceptions and result in the decline and eventually in a collapse of legitimacy for 
the entire organization. Nike, a company known for innovative marketing and design, became 
the poster child for the anti-globalization and sweatshop movement due to incidences in its 
supply chain. Phil Knight, the CEO of Nike lamented in a May 1998 speech to the National 
Press Club “the Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, 
and arbitrary abuse.” This empirical example shows that even the design of individual organi-
zational subunits (e.g. in the Nike case the policies of the sourcing department) can be critical 
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for the perception of corporate legitimacy. For analyzing how corporate legitimacy is man-
aged, it is therefore necessary to zoom into the organization and assess how organizational 
subunits (typically on a departmental level) respond to legitimacy challenges, how they coor-
dinate their responses with other subunits and how conflicting demands are being handled 
(Delmas and Toffel, 2008). 
This claim is supported by the theoretical insights from contingency theory (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Donaldson, 2001) and institutional theory (Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). We argue that the ideas of the theoretical lens 
of contingency theory are analogous to the process of managing legitimacy. In contingency 
theory, corporations ensure organizational effectiveness by maintaining a fit between the con-
tingencies of the environment and the organization’s design (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967; Donaldson, 2001). Likewise, for managing legitimacy, corporations seek 
maintaining a fit between its operations and social expectations. There is no “one best way” 
approach for creating and maintaining this fit, but the functional subunits of an organization 
need to monitor the external demands, discuss these with other departments, and agree on a 
coordinated response. The study of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) on the differentiation and 
integration in complex organizations highlights that each functional subunit of an organiza-
tion deals with its own, very specific environmental context (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 5). 
Institutional theory conceives of organizations as a “mosaic of groups structured by functional 
tasks” (Hinings and Greenwood, 1996: 1033) that are the basis of the differentiation into or-
ganizational subunits or departments (e.g. procurement, production, human resources, legal 
affairs, marketing etc). These subunits or departments create linkages with their specific target 
groups in the environment (e.g. marketing with customers, legal affairs with government offi-
cials etc.) and form “occupational communities” (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984) that are ex-
posed to the same issues and share common professions, languages and views across different 
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organizations, but not so much with other departments of the same organization which may 
create tensions (Delmas and Toffel, 2008).  
Given these insights from contingency theory and institutional theory, we argue that the func-
tional subunits of an organization are the appropriate unit of analysis for empirical research on 
corporate response strategies to complex environments. The analysis of the specific environ-
mental demands in relation to the subunit’s functional objectives and the objectives of other 
organizational subunits will reveal the tensions and contradictions that organizations must 
deal with in order to maintain their legitimacy.  
Our research project addresses corporate legitimacy strategies in dynamic environments and 
explores the organizational implications of corporate responses to institutional complexity and 
heterogeneous demands (for an overview see Greenwood et al., 2011; Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2010). The discussion in this context acknowledges that the environmental demands on an 
organization are always to some degree in conflict and trade-offs are therefore necessary 
(March, 1991). Although these tensions can never be fully unraveled, the most successful 
organizations balance them to a large degree, and in so doing enhance their long-term compet-
itiveness (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). The dilemma of contradicting demands is captured 
in the vast array of extant paradox literature (for an overview see Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
Paradoxes are defined as contradictory yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and 
persist over time (Smith and Lewis, 2011: 382). Corporations, in their quest to maintain their 
corporate legitimacy, must therefore develop organizational designs and competences that 
enable the corporation to manage these paradoxes and flexibly adapt to changing situational 
requirements (Pache and Santos, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013).  
In light of increasingly complex and dynamic environments, some organizational scholars 
advocate the idea of organic fluidity that enables the organization to rapidly change strategies 
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and adapt to new environmental demands if necessary (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005). Organizational forms that allow for 
structural fluidity, such as modular organizations (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) or latent or-
ganizations (Starkey et al., 2000), are able to accommodate environmental complexities yet 
they ignore the hidden institutional dynamics that often prevail in organizations (Schreyögg 
and Sydow, 2010). Path-dependence, recursive practices, economies of specialization or 
mechanisms that foster identity stand in stark contrast to the imperative of flexibility yet they 
cannot be entirely eliminated through fluid organizational design (Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2010). Moreover, hyper-flexible models based on relentlessly changing templates, quick im-
provisation, and ad hoc responses conflict with efforts to achieve organizational efficiency 
(Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). Organizational features that typically advance efficiency – 
formal rules and routines – ensure that performance is repeatable and reliable. To make use of 
the advantages of efficient bureaucratic replication, rigid organizational elements are therefore 
also desirable. To manage corporate legitimacy without jeopardizing organizational efficien-
cy, corporations must therefore be able to exploit current capabilities while simultaneously 
exploring fundamentally new competencies. To perform such paradoxical processes (see 
Graetz and Smith, 2008; Smith and Lewis, 2011) a well-known suggestion for handling para-
doxical demands is to develop organizational ambidexterity (Raisch et al., 2009; O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). The concept refers to an organizational struc-
ture that synchronically masters adaptable fluidity and efficient stability by designing organi-
zational subunits that are either efficient or innovative. Consequently, some subsystems are 
held stable while others are fully flexible. An advancement of structural ambidexterity, con-
textual ambidexterity, focuses in addition on the individual members of organizations. Con-
textual ambidexterity refers to an organizational context that enables the organizational mem-
bers to make diligent judgments when faced with paradoxical demands. Organizational mem-
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bers handle paradoxes successfully if the organization’s behavior is perceived as legitimate. 
There is no single pathway to contextual ambidexterity but there are some beneficial factors 
that were identified in empirical studies (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004; O’Reilly III and 
Tushman, 2011). For example, the consistent application of the same levers (e.g. training or 
participative strategic planning), organizational empowerment, and role model leadership help 
creating a supportive context. Our in-depth case study will closely analyze the context in 
which Puma employees are handling paradoxical stakeholder demands. 
Schreyögg and Sydow (2010) expressed a number of concerns regarding the workability of 
the contextual ambidexterity concept, in particular the fact that the concept imposes signifi-
cant responsibilities on the individual. Schreyögg and Sydow do not find support in organiza-
tion theory for the assumption that the organizational context design can be sufficiently sup-
portive to allow individuals to behave in a way that contradicts to given organizational rules 
and incentives. They also doubt that a climate of trust, stretch, discipline, and support as such 
can induce a highly problem-specific behavior (cf. Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010: 1257). Given 
these pitfalls of the ambidexterity concept, Schreyögg and Sydow (2010) developed an alter-
native approach that complements the ambidexterity concept. They suggest that corporations 
should aim for a concurrent balancing of contradictory demands within a single organization-
al unit. They view the contradictory functions of fluidity and efficient replication as counter-
vailing processes that organizations and their subunits have to balance. More specifically, 
balancing means on the one hand to constantly reflect on all procedures that stabilize the or-
ganization. On the other hand, it refers to developing organizational antenna functions that 
react sensibly to potential changes in the environment (cf. Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010: 1258 
ff.). 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING CORPORATE RESPONSE 
STRATEGIES 
Based on the theoretical insights from the first part of this paper, we design our empirical re-
search around the main functional subunits of an organization and select issues that allow us 
to track the organization’s learning over time. We will identify the legitimation strategies at 
play and analyze how the corporation under review adjusted organizational structures and 
procedures. Theory building on legitimacy strategies and their organizational implications in 
complex environments is not far developed yet. We therefore follow an explorative approach 
in order to formulate propositions and base our arguments on insights from a longitudinal case 
study that is based on a rich date set from a variety of sources. Under these circumstances the 
case study approach has been proven suitable (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 
1994). 
We first explain our research methodology, including case selection (2.1), operationalization 
of the theoretical core concepts (2.2), data gathering (2.3) and data analysis (2.4). We then 
outline our research results in chapter 3. Our empirical analysis rests upon an in-depth case 
study of Puma, the German sportswear manufacturer. In the study, we explore how Puma is 
managing corporate legitimacy over time. Our qualitative study refers to interview data from 
2003 and 2011.  
Case Selection 
For our empirical analysis of corporate response strategies, we have chosen a company that is 
particularly exposed to conflicting stakeholder expectations and is apparently able to success-
fully manage these demands. Puma has a reputable (and therefore vulnerable) brand image in 
the trend-driven consumer goods industry. Moreover, the company is operating in an industry 
that is highly sensitive to reports on poor social and environmental standards. Based on a his-
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tory of corporate scandals in the industry since the early 1990s, many sportswear manufactur-
ers launched Codes of Conducts and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives (Kolk 
and van Tulder, 2001). Yet, the companies’ investments in the CSR context need to be ex-
plained to investors and consumers whose main interests are typically focused on short-term 
profitability, product quality, brand coolness, and low retail prizes respectively. This interest 
in cheaper products and higher share value are potentially in conflict with the interests of 
workers and NGOs targeting the organization.  Puma has won numerous CSR awards and 
since December 2010, Puma is also the industry leader of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
In addition, the company is a member of the Global Compact and the Fair Labor Association 
and it is participating in a number of other industry and issue specific initiatives (e.g. the 
Asian Floor Wage Campaign). These memberships and awards suggest that Puma has over a 
long stretch of time successfully managed corporate legitimacy and it is therefore likely that 
our study focuses on a “good practice example” from which other companies could learn.  
This assumption is further supported by data from a Reputational Risk database (RepRisk), a 
database that pools news outlets from independent third parties (print media, NGO websites, 
blogs etc.) which report on social and environmental issues at companies. The RepRisk index 
(RRI) is calculated based on the influence of information sources, the frequency and timing of 
the information, as well as the content, including the severity (harshness) and novelty (new-
ness) of the issues addressed (see reprisk.com). We argue that this RepRisk index presents a 
proxy for corporate legitimacy and in general, the lower the index - it ranges from zero (low-
est) to 100 (highest) – the more apt are probably the companies’ response strategies to hetero-
geneous stakeholder expectations (because no further negative news indirectly suggests that 
the issue was resolved). The index starts tracking data in 2006, so unfortunately we cannot 
track Puma’s RepRisk index back to 2003. However, Puma’s average risk index lies in the 
spectrum that corresponds to a medium risk exposure (25-50). This average score, while not 
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particularly low in general terms (probably due to the close monitoring of specialized watch-
dog organizations), is typical for companies in the sporting goods industry (Nike, Adidas 
etc.). What is remarkable for Puma, however, is that the company always managed to return 
to average RRI scores after peaks within short time periods. For example, in August 2011 the 
RRI for Puma was 55; in September 2011 it was at 46, in October 2011 it was already back 
down at 33. This is an indication that the company dealt appropriately with emerging issues 
(in this case with the allegation from Greenpeace that its fabrics contain toxics1); negative 
reporting petered out quickly, and scores normalized. 2
This interpretation of the RepRisk data is supported by an in-depth study of Puma’s critical 
stakeholder environment (Pflitsch 2009). The study is based on interviews of the participants 
at Puma’s annual stakeholder meeting, most of them critical NGOs (Christliche Initiative 
Romero, Greenpeace, Misereor, Oxfam etc). Despite of the critical focus of these NGOs, they 
confirm in the interviews that the annual meetings and the regular interactions with company 
representatives had established a good working relationship (Pflitsch, 2009). 
 Thus, companies that successfully 
manage legitimacy are not necessarily without crisis but if a crisis hits, they respond to it in an 
adequate way and are able to repair legitimacy in a timely manner. 
Our study follows the tradition of interpretative longitudinal case studies that focus on single 
exceptional cases (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Harreld et al., 2007; Etzion and Ferraro, 
2010). The authors had unique access to the activities of the organization and its senior man-
 
 
1  See report at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/Dirty-
Laundry-2/ 
2 For the purpose of our study, Reprisk AG in Zurich granted us free access to the RepRisk 
database. We are grateful for their support 
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agement team. During a research stay at Puma in 2003, one of the authors established trust 
with the team in charge of sustainability, and in the following years, all authors continuously 
followed Puma’s development in various roles. The aim of our empirical study is to identify 
independent variables that are relevant for managing legitimacy. We will, as a result of our 
explorative study, generate testable propositions that prepare future large-n studies on corpo-
rate response strategies in complex environments.  
Operationalizing the Core Concepts 
In this section we will define and operationalize the theoretical core concepts for our empiri-
cal work (legitimacy strategies, balancing of fluid and rigid structures, contextual ambidexter-
ity). These core concepts provide the foundation for the analysis of our empirical data (the 
coding process).  
Operationalizing legitimacy strategies: The legitimacy strategies outlined above apply differ-
ent means to retain or regain legitimacy. Argumentation strategies require dialogue with 
stakeholders to find common ground and reach consensus or agree on compromise solutions. 
In an (ideal) argumentative process, the parties aim to explain their positions and to convince 
their opponents with the help of good reasons. Ideally, power is largely absent from the inter-
action except for the power of the better argument which defines the outcome of the dialogue 
(Habermas 1983/2001: 89). Manipulation strategies aim at influencing the corporate environ-
ments in favor of the corporate strategy, often with the help of PR and marketing tools. The 
aim is to persuade (rather than convince) the other party of the corporate position. Adaptation 
strategies are probably the most difficult to detect as adaptation is often a non-communicated, 
incremental process. Therefore, to identify an adaptation strategy typically requires compar-
ing the environmental demands and corporate actions. Adaptation could, however, also be the 
result of a stakeholder dialogue (because the corporation acknowledges the rightness of stake-
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holder demands) or the proactive response to an emerging trend (which the company correctly 
anticipated). If a company commits to a standard (e.g. Rainforest Alliance), this could either 
be an adaptation strategy or an argumentation strategy, depending on how well established the 
standard already is. If the standard still needs to be developed, we argue that this is an argu-
mentation strategy; yet if already many companies participate in a well-established standard, 
then we argue that participation is an adaptation strategy.   
Operationalizing the Organizational Context: To enable the activation of multiple legitimacy 
strategies at the same time, the literature suggests that the organization needs to establish a 
specific organizational architecture that consists of rigid and fluid organizational structures. 
Rigid structural elements typically promote the exploitation of capacities while fluid struc-
tures are better suited to explore new capabilities (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). Under fluid 
structures, we understand organizational elements that can be adjusted easily to emerging en-
vironmental contingencies. Rigid organizational elements, in contrast, are routines and proce-
dures that foster efficiencies. The act of balancing fluid and rigid organizational structures 
requires individual capacities and design elements that facilitate reflection and discussion 
over the usefulness of both, fluid and rigid structures. The question that the organization 
needs to answer in the balancing process is whether the organizational design is still adequate 
given the environmental requirements and to decide consciously whether or not to adjust.  In 
our empirical study we will therefore focus on these reflective mechanisms that were installed 
for balancing. Reflective elements can have the form of regular inter-departmental meetings, 
platforms for internal discussions, advisory boards, or other consultative sessions with exter-
nal and internal experts and stakeholders. BALANCING thus refers to any reflections that 
critically examine the fit between the external demands and the ability of internal structures to 
respond to external demands in an adequate manner. 
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To further assess whether the organizational setting is prepared to handle legitimacy challeng-
es, we analyze whether or not the organization has adopted an ambidextrous organizational 
design. Based on relevant literature in the field, O’Reilly III and Tushman (2011: 9) argue 
that five conditions are critical for creating contextual ambidexterity across the exploitative 
and explorative units. We adopt these five key design elements and adjust them slightly for 
our context of managing legitimacy. We also operationalize each design element to guide the 
coding process. 
• (1) STRATEGIC INTENT to build an organization that is able to manage heterogene-
ous stakeholder demands  
• (2) VISION and VALUES to create a strong organizational identity that provides 
guidance in paradoxical situations  
• (3) COMMITTED LEADERSHIP TEAM that is fully supporting the strategic intent 
and the corporate vision and whose incentives reward this commitment 
• (4) SEPARATE BUT ALIGNED ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE that ena-
bles both, exploitation and exploration but is aligned at the strategic level 
• (5) REMEDIAL SENIOR MANAGERS that are able to resolve interdepartmental ten-
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(reflective mechanisms to continuously ensure the adequacy of the organizational setting) 
Figure 1: Overview Table of Theoretical Concepts   Source: Own 
 
Data Gathering 
For studying corporate response strategies (our dependent variable), we selected three issues 
in the context of CSR that caused legitimacy challenges for the company (Fair Play for the 
Olympics Campaign; Fair Wages; Sustainable Products). In all three instances, the company’s 
legitimacy was publicly contested and Puma has/had to manage potentially paradoxical de-
mands from their stakeholders. Each issue triggered media attention and Puma was forced to 
position itself and respond to its critics.  It can be expected that the situation of critical media 
coverage and public contestation will accentuate the organizational mechanisms that are at 
play when different legitimation strategies need to be coordinated. 
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The issue of the past, the Fair Play for the Olympics Campaign, was launched in early 2004, 
during the run-up for the Olympic Games in Athens. The Campaign targeted the sportswear 
industry for abusive labor conditions in their supply chain and it was organized in over 35 
countries by a coalition of over 100 critical civil society organizations (e.g. Oxfam, Clean 
Clothes Campaign). Puma was attacked for excessive working hours and its non-systematic 
implementation of the right to freedom of association in their supplier factories. A meeting 
between Puma and Bulgarian unions/NGOs took place at the end of 2004. In 2005, Puma 
agreed to run a pilot project with the CIR (Christliche Initiative Romero) to improve working 
conditions in two factories in El Salvador. 
The ongoing issue chosen for this study, fair wages, causes probably the most situations of 
conflict between textile companies and civil society organizations. NGOs demand from com-
panies that they not only ensure the payment of the legal minimum wage for workers in their 
supply chain but that they support a so-called “living wage”. In many countries the legal min-
imum wage is not even able to cover workers’ basic needs and therefore labor rights groups 
expect corporations to lobby for, or pay for adequate salaries (Bhattacharjee and Merk, 2011). 
In the early phases of the wage discussion the idea of a living wage was rejected by most 
sportswear brands, arguing that they first need to ensure that all their suppliers pay at least the 
legal minimum (Miller and Williams, 2009). In a second phase, various stakeholders got in-
volved in exploring ways how the actual living wage of a country/region/worker could be 
determined (Bhattacharjee and Merk, 2011). These discussions in which Puma participated 
soon reached a deadlock due to a lacking consensus over the definition and calculation meth-
odology of a living wage (Bhattacharjee and Merk, 2011). At the 2010 Stakeholder Meeting 
in Banz, Puma’s CEO Jochen Zeitz proactively committed Puma to working towards fair 
wages. He highlighted that the implementation of fair wages will take time but that all func-
tional units at Puma will be contributing to this goal (Meeting Minutes Banz 2010). In line 
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with this commitment, Puma agreed to a pilot project with the Asia Floor Wage initiative 
(AFW) in 2011. The AFW has developed a formula for developing fair wages 
(http://www.asiafloorwage.org/).  
The current issue of conflict (proactively) responds to the growing expectations of consumers 
and environmental activists that corporations minimize the harmful environmental impact of 
the production of their products. At the Stakeholder Meeting in Banz in 2010, Puma put the 
issue of sustainable products on the agenda and presented several targets that concretize its 
commitment to the Puma Vision of becoming a sustainable brand. The targets include reduc-
ing the emissions in logistics by 25%; using 100% sustainable packaging, becoming carbon 
neutral, and offering 50% sustainable products by 2015. To measure progress, Puma devel-
oped its own sustainability index by which the sustainability of a product can be assessed 
(min of 50% sustainable materials and good S.A.F.E. rating). Currently, the company is work-
ing towards meeting these self-defined objectives while civil society organizations demand to 
closely monitor the process. 
The three selected issues are at different points in their life-cycle: one issue from the past 
(Fair Play Campaign), one ongoing issue (Fair Wages) and one current issue (Sustainable 
Products). This threefold focus enables us to examine and compare the company’s handling of 
paradoxical stakeholder demands at different points in time. Our data points stretch from 2003 
to 2011 and we track the changes in Puma’s response strategies and analyze the organization-
al learning process. The question at stake is whether corporations that operate in complex en-
vironments become increasingly ambidextrous and are better prepared to handle paradoxical 
demands. 
The issues around which our study revolves were selected after consultations with experts 
from civil society organizations and representatives of PUMA.  To study the response strate-
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gies of Puma for each of these issues, we conducted 12 open-ended, semi-structured inter-
views with the entire senior management team of Puma, including the CEO. As suggested by 
contingency theorists (see chapter 1.2), we in particular focused on the department heads 
(Sustainability (S.A.F.E.), Investor Relations, International Marketing, Sourcing, Design, PR 
and Communication, Human Resources, and Strategy) because typically each department 
responds to a specific environment which consists of a specific group of stakeholders. The 
department for sustainability (Puma S.A.F.E.) deals with civil society organizations; Investor 
Relations deals with investors; Marketing deals with consumers, Sourcing deals with the pro-
ducing factories; PR deals with Media; Human Resources deals with employees. For our 
study, we were interested in identifying the specific point of view of each department on each 
issue, the coordination and conflict resolution mechanisms between the departments, and the 
external communication with the stakeholders. Therefore, all respondents were asked to de-
scribe (1) their departmental position on the issue, (2) their role in the discussions about how 
to deal with the issue, (3) the organizational structures and procedures that were relevant for 
coordinating the response strategies and (4) their communication to their specific group of 
stakeholders. 
The respondents were reminded prior to the interview to respond to our questions as repre-
sentatives of their specific department and to clearly indicate when they want to express per-
sonal views that do not overlap with the departmental position. All interview partners re-
ceived a brief introduction to our study and they were then asked to describe the departmental 
proceedings around the pre-selected events. Since the interviewees were asked to comment on 
the same events we were able to capture different perspectives and expose conflicting depart-
mental objectives. All but two interviews were conducted in person at Puma’s headquarters in 
Herzogenaurach, Germany. Two interviews were conducted by telephone. All interviews 
were audio recorded and the close to literal transcriptions (almost 100 pages, singe-spaced) 
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were shared with the respondents for approval. The approved documents (the interview part-
ners only made minor changes to correct facts or figures) present the basis for our data analy-
sis procedure. We also analyzed meeting minutes (e.g. the meeting minutes of the stakeholder 
meetings in Banz) and strategic documents to triangulate our interview data. 
Data Analysis 
Our data analysis followed a two-step coding procedure. We used our theoretical insights to 
identify theoretical categories (see chapter 1.3). These categories included the three legitima-
cy strategies (adaptation, manipulation, argumentation) and, for the organizational imple-
mentation of managing legitimacy, we focused on the balancing mechanisms of rigid and 
fluid organizational structures, and the five dimension of an ambidextrous organizational 
setting.  
In a first step, one of the authors coded the document to check for any ambiguities in the 
codes and further improve their clarity. The codes were assigned to meaningful text segments 
(sometimes at the sentence-level, sometimes question and answer). To increase the internal 
validity of our study, we employed an independent researcher with demonstrated coding ex-
perience to re-code the interview transcripts. We shared the first part of this paper with the 
independent researcher to familiarize him with our theoretical concepts. The independent re-
searcher was then asked to read through the entire interview transcript document and elicit the 
most relevant interview statements. In this step, all repetitive statements and descriptions that 
were beyond the focus of our work were removed and the amount of data was consolidated to 
a more manageable size (from approx. 100 to 20 pages). In a second step, the independent 
researcher was asked to assign our 9 codes (ADAPTATION; MANIPULATION; ARGU-
MENTATION; STRATEGIC INTENT; VISION & VALUE; COMMITTED LEADERSHIP 
TEAM; SEPARATE BUT ALIGNED ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE; REMEDI-
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AL SENIOR MANAGER; BALANCING) to the remaining interview statements. Text ele-
ments that could not be assigned were put aside for further analysis. Through this process, we 
identified elements that are possibly important for successfully managing legitimacy. The 
coding results of the independent researcher were discussed with the author who did the orig-
inal coding and the agreement between the two researchers, and hence inter-rater reliability, 
was high. 
In 2003, we already collected interview data at Puma. For our study of the organizational im-
plementation of Puma’s CSR program, we interviewed senior managers to assess their level 
of awareness for potential areas of conflict within the organization. The study was less sys-
tematic than the recent study yet the interview notes still serve as a reference point for track-
ing changes in legitimacy strategies over time (Baumann 2003). 
MANAGING CORPORATE LEGITIMACY AT PUMA 
We will first describe how Puma’s repertoire of legitimacy strategies evolved from 2003 – 
2011. We will use the data from 2003 and the data that we gathered around the 3 pre-selected 
crisis points to identify the type of legitimation strategy. Our analysis traces the events in a 
chronological order. We will then zoom into the organization to focus in greater detail on the 
evolution of organizational structures and procedures. This meso-level assessment highlights 
how Puma has over time adapted to these legitimacy challenges on an organizational level. 




Learning to Respond to Paradoxical Stakeholder Demands 
In 2003, Puma was for the very first time the target of a major campaign by NGOs. The 
Christliche Initiative Romero in collaboration with the Clean Clothes Campaign accused Pu-
ma for tolerating poor working conditions at one of Puma’s supplier factories in Mexico. The 
case at the Matamoros factory hit Puma unprepared and initially, they issued a number of 
press statements in an effort to clarify the facts and pointing to their system of regular social 
compliance audits. In these statements, Puma did not agree with the accusations and they tried 
to convince the critical audience of a different reality (MANIPULATION). As Puma realized 
that their measures did not satisfy the NGOs and the media pressure continued rising, they 
changed strategy and started engaging in discussions with individual critics (ARGUMENTA-
TION). The company eventually arranged a meeting with all stakeholders in Banz, a former 
monastery in Germany. The “Talks at Banz” were held in late 2003 and the exchange at this 
meeting exposed major differences between the position of the company and the NGOs. Alt-
hough Puma had in principle committed to an argumentation strategy, a dialogue culture first 
had to be established (Minutes Banz 2003). Despite of the rather rough exchange with their 
critics, Puma decided to institutionalize the Banz meetings and the meetings were since held 
annually. The dialogue platform was instrumental for strengthening relationships with various 
stakeholder groups, for monitoring societal trends, and for explaining the company’s position 
to its critics. It also served as a regular organizational check-up to ensure that the organiza-
tional setting was able to adequately respond to the various stakeholder requests (BALANC-
ING). The head of the S.A.F.E. department points out that this major first campaign triggered 
learnings for Puma – 
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“After Matamoros, we initiated the first Talks at Banz. … through these talks, we iden-
tified the value-added of those campaigns, … to approach the NGOs and engage them 
in dialogue. “ (Head S.A.F.E Department) 
The PR department argues that the dialogue with stakeholders has been critical for Puma’s 
organizational development. It helped the company to formulate and implement Puma’s sus-
tainability strategy (BALANCING) – 
“The dialogue with critical stakeholders definitely changed the whole attitude… It 
helped them (the SAFE department) to formulate their strategy and implement it appro-
priately.” (PR Department) 
Shortly after the first stakeholder meeting in Banz, Puma joined the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA), a multi-stakeholder initiative set up to improve workers’ rights in the supply chain 
(www.fairlabor.org).  The decision to participate in the FLA further manifests Puma’s intent 
to engage with all relevant stakeholders and to allow for independent third parties to assess its 
supply chain (AMBIDEXTERITY; STRATEGIC INTENT). Today, Puma’s entire senior 
management team participates in these meetings (AMBIDEXTERITY; COMMITED LEAD-
ERSHIP TEAM). The team is committed to the open-ended dialogue process despite of the 
difficulties of establishing a constructive dialogue. Senior managers at Puma were also in-
strumental for making the organizational changes happen internally. They started adjusting 
performance targets for the purchasing department to smooth out potential conflicts with the 
S.A.F.E department (REMEDIAL SENIOR MANAGERS). 
As the Fair Play of the Olympics Campaign was launched in 2004, Puma had already experi-
enced that a pure manipulation strategy would not be successful. The head of the S.A.F.E. 
department pointed out that the campaign was the start of a reflection process (BALANC-
ING): 
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“(The Fair Play of the Olympics Campaign) did of course trigger some actions and 
thoughts - perhaps not immediately though. We did not immediately change all our pol-
icies. But at least it made us think!” (Head S.A.F.E. Department) 
The sourcing department confirms that the second large campaign against Puma led to a sub-
stantial assessment of Puma’s sourcing strategy:  
“The 2004 Fair Play at the Olympics campaign was the proof that sourcing like it was 
done at the time was wrong! The campaign provided us with arguments to say ‘You see 
guys, as long as we don’t change, we will be confronted with these issues.’ ” (Sourcing 
Department) 
The senior management team of Puma (AMBIDEXTERITY; COMMITED LEADERSHIP 
TEAM) hence decided to discuss with NGOs a plan of action and adapt to some of the de-
mands (ADAPTATION), particularly the NGO’s request for dialogue (ARGUMENTA-
TION). The adaptations to some of these demands initially had a patchwork character. Puma 
committed to a training on workers’ rights and a pilot project, but a more substantial revision 
of their entire supply chain followed later (Interview Sourcing Department). Thus, while 
Puma adapted to some of the NGO’s demands (ADAPTATION) and continuously engaged in 
dialogue (ARGUMENTATION), they were also hoping to win time for more substantial or-
ganizational changes. For this purpose Puma in 2004 hired a supply chain management expert 
from one of their competitors to set up a new sourcing structure. Thus, these first NGO cam-
paigns against Puma forced the company to enlarge its repertoire of legitimation strategies. 
Until 2003, Puma could rely on its manipulative PR strategies to maintain corporate legitima-
cy, however, once attacked by NGOs on its labor rights issues on the supply chain, the com-
pany could no longer keep critics at bay by issuing press statements. Puma already realized 
after the Matamoros crisis that engaging in dialogue with its critics would be inevitable in 
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order to maintain its legitimacy, and hence, as the Fair Play Campaign was launched in 2004, 
Puma was already much quicker at switching to an argumentation strategy (ARGUMENTA-
TION). Once involved in a dialogue, the company often had little choice but adapting to some 
of the NGO’s demands (ADAPTATION) but they also had the chance to explain their para-
doxical situation and, at least for some time, calm down upset stakeholders. The head of the 
S.A.F.E. department argues that today the organization is better prepared for a crisis – 
“2004 was definitely also different compared to today because in 2004 the Safe depart-
ment was still in the early phase of its development.” (Head S.A.F.E. Department) 
The issue of fair wages was brought up first at around the time of the Fair Play Campaign. 
Puma could not easily adapt to the demand to pay fair wages – it would require a lot of re-
sources to calculate and implement a fair wage (besides, the concept of a fair wage is far from 
being clear or consensually agreed upon) - and hence they initially refused to commit to any-
thing but ensuring the payments of the legal minimum wages. Based on their experience from 
the past events, they however also committed to staying involved in the discussions over fair 
wages. The PR department explains how Puma dealt with the paradoxical demands from in-
vestors and critical NGOs – 
“The investors, as they focus on the financials, are critical that our CSR or sustainability 
concepts are costing too much money and that it does not translate into direct profits. 
So, the company is wasting money. However, if you convince them [highlighted by the 
authors] that the consumers will prefer to buy our products because we care about sus-
tainability aspects, you speak their language and even they understand our strategy.” 
(PR Department) 
This description shows that particularly paradoxical demands (here from the financial com-
munity and the NGO community) triggered deep reflections on Puma’s organizational setting 
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and its communication style (BALANCING).  Puma made an effort to create common ground 
among different stakeholder groups by carefully selecting the appropriate language and ra-
tionale for each stakeholder group. To resolve the contradicting demands of investors and 
NGOs on the issue of fair wages, Puma decided to persuade the investors of the rightness of 
their commitments so that they would perceive the wage issue of strategic importance for the 
continued financial success of the company (MANIPULATION). Hence, through means of 
manipulation, Puma was able to create an environment that is favorable to investments in sus-
tainability projects. 
The issue of sustainable products was put on the agenda by Puma itself. The expectation that 
corporations look into the sustainability of their products was already emerging as a general 
trend but no advocacy group had specifically addressed Puma yet in this context. The compa-
ny decided to proactively adapt to this trend before it fully emerges (ADAPTATION) and 
define targets and milestones which were presented at the annual stakeholder meeting 2011 in 
Banz (see Minutes Banz 2011). The statements of the CEO about this process show that the 
dialogue forum was also used to manipulate critical stakeholders – 
“I think that part of the dialogue (at the annual stakeholder meeting in Banz) is also to 
educate them a little bit (highlighted by the authors) that the world is not just about la-
bour issues. It is not as simple; things are interconnected. If we ultimately want a sus-
tainable business, we have to look at several critical areas that we feel are important to 
define in the DNA of our company, in order to accomplish our mission, which has sus-
tainability as its base. … Most people don’t or cannot think holistically. They are in 
their box and that is a problem!” (CEO) 
The chronological analysis of crisis points suggests that Puma has advanced at activating var-
ious legitimacy strategies and also activates different legitimacy strategies in parallel for dif-
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ferent stakeholder communities. While the company is manipulating its investor environment, 
they are engaging in argumentation strategies with the NGOs.  Puma has, however, also learnt 
to combine different legitimation strategies and occasionally instrumentalizes argumentation 
platforms for manipulation strategies or to proactively present adaptations to emerging trends. 
This approach is however not without risks.  In fact, it backfired in 2007 as the NGOs refused 
to participate in the annual stakeholder meeting in Banz due to the fact that they could not 
participate in the design of the meeting agenda (Pflitsch, 2009). Puma had to change the pro-
cess to bring these actors back to the table. 
The consequences of Puma’s engagement in sustainability occasionally caused inter-
departmental conflict. The commitments that Puma made at the stakeholder meetings were 
particularly difficult to implement for the sourcing department (see interviews). Several inter-
view partners mentioned that inter-departmental conflicts became easier to manage as Puma 
formulated a clear corporate vision and mission statement that incorporated sustainability 
(VISION & MISSION). Puma Vision highlights four core values and the mission statement 
placed sustainability at the heart of the company’s strategic focus. These measures provide 
direction for all departments and helped to harmonize interdepartmental conflict (REMEDI-
AL SENIOR MANAGERS; see interviews).  
Still, explaining Puma’s strategy to external stakeholder groups with conflicting expectations 
remains a constant challenge for the company. To resolve this specific challenge, Puma is 
currently working on developing a new reporting structure that links sustainability data direct-
ly with financial data. This way, it will be easier for the company to convince investors of the 
usefulness of these activities (MANIPULATION). Likewise, Puma carefully adjusts its mode 
of communication with consumers and suppliers in order to convey the sustainability aspects 
of a product (MANIPULATION). The sourcing department works in close collaboration with 
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its suppliers to convince them that there is a business case for sustainable products and it 
forms strategic partnerships with the suppliers that agree to support Puma’s vision (MANIP-
ULATION). Thus, corporate messages are adjusted depending on the stakeholder group con-
cerned (MANIPULATION). 
“Of course you have to try to speak the language of different stakeholders. You need to 
kind of translate the message. Some need a more technical message, the consumers a 
more motivational message and your shareholders need the message in yet another lan-
guage. But it’s ultimately the same message that you need to communicate. It’s just the 
expression of the message that needs to be adjusted, so that the different stakeholders 
understand your point of view.” (CEO) 
The analysis of crisis points traced the evolution of Puma’s repertoire of legitimacy strategies. 
The longitudinal study shows that Puma learnt over time how to manage conflicting stake-
holder demands – 
(1) by committing to continued dialogue with its critics (growing importance of argumenta-
tion strategies) 
(2) by activating different legitimation strategies in parallel (while Puma engages in argumen-
tation strategies with civil society organizations, manipulation strategies are activated for in-
vestors, consumers, and suppliers) 
 (3) by developing hybrid forms of legitimacy strategies and by proactively defining the agen-
da (platforms designed for argumentation are also used for manipulation; adaptation occurs 
before issues emerge) 
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Organizational Adjustments for Managing Legitimacy  
In this section we outline the critical organizational features that support Puma’s management 
of legitimacy. Based on our theoretical insights, we will pay special attention to the features 
that create a context of ambidexterity and any reflective mechanisms that the company in-
stalled to balance counter-veiling processes.  
In 2003, Puma’s organizational structures and procedures around sustainability were at an 
infant stage (Baumann, 2003). Sustainability issues that arose were managed in an ad hoc 
manner, involving individual senior managers, the PR department and the S.A.F.E. depart-
ment while other departments were not much involved. Thus, paradoxical stakeholder de-
mands were handled by a few individuals in a rather isolated and non-systematic manner 
(Baumann, 2003). This situation changed drastically over the years. In 2003, it was for exam-
ple not yet possible to interview the head of human resources, marketing and investor rela-
tions departments due to their lack of engagement and knowledge about sustainability topics 
(Baumann, 2003). This suggests that some departments were isolated from the turmoil in Pu-
ma’s stakeholder environment and continued doing business-as-usual which can easily result 
in lacking alignment. In 2011, all functional heads were included in our study and our inter-
view partners all confirmed their involvement in the handling of paradoxical stakeholder de-
mands (see interviews). So, while some departments are still protected from handling compli-
cated stakeholder demands, informal and formal communications on sustainability issues was 
reaching all departments and, as a result, alignment with corporate objectives was much 
greater (SEPARATE BUT ALIGNED ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE). 
Critical for this transition was certainly the introduction of the Puma Vision in 2008 through 
which Puma re-defined its strategic focus and explicitly added sustainability to their mission 
statement (“Puma aims to become the most desirable and sustainable sport-lifestyle compa-
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ny”) (STRATEGIC INTENT). In this context, Puma also defined four core values - fair, hon-
est, positive, creative - that should drive its business conduct. Puma Vision thus sets clear 
priorities and serves all employees as a compass for the decision-making and the communica-
tion with stakeholders (VISION & MISSION).  
Puma also created two new senior management posts to ensure the operationalization and 
integration of the corporate vision in daily business processes (Head Puma Creative; Head 
Puma Global Strategy). It is in the responsibility of the Global Strategy department to define 
the operative milestones of the corporate vision (Puma Drive), improve communication to 
stakeholders, and to oversee the implementation process (STRATEGIC INTENT). A regular 
teleconference run by the Head of Global Strategy involves representatives of all departments 
and ensures that the implementation of Puma’s corporate vision stays on track (SEPARATE 
BUT ALIGNED ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE). 
To measure the compliance with Puma’s vision, incentive systems were adapted and trainings 
for Puma’s management team were introduced in 2009 (see Interview HRM; STRATEGIC 
INTENT). The performance review of managers now includes an assessment of how well the 
managers met their business and sustainability targets and the results are directly linked to 
bonus payments. (Interview HRM; COMMITTED LEADERSHIP TEAM). These measures 
show that Puma put in place incentives to ensure the implementation of Puma’s strategy and 
to guide the handling of paradoxical stakeholder demands. Instrumental in setting up these 
formal procedures was Puma’s CEO (STRATEGIC INTENT). He argues that defining mile-
stones and key performance indicators is critical for the implementation of the Puma vision 
and for managing corporate legitimacy (SEPARATE BUT ALIGNED ORGANIZATIONAL 
ARCHITECTURE). Without exception, all interview partners highlighted that the leadership 
of the CEO in this change management process of the past years has been crucial for the 
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commitment of Puma’s leadership team and Puma’s external credibility (COMMITTED 
LEADERSHIP TEAM). 
Despite of some formal organizational elements that were set up to better manage corporate 
legitimacy (e.g. incentive systems for the Puma managers), most of the internal coordination 
at PUMA remained informal. Informal mechanisms are easily adjustable to new environmen-
tal requirements and thus they serve dynamic fields and explorative ventures, like it is the 
case with sustainability issues. For example, the coordination between the sourcing and the 
S.A.F.E. department which is critical for the implementation of Puma’s Code of Conduct was 
informal in 2003 (Baumann, 2003) and largely stayed informal until today (Interview 
S.A.F.E, Sourcing, HRM). The benefits of informal and open communication channels were 
highlighted by all interview partners – 
“The coordination is less formal and communication is happening regularly across all 
functions…This (the informality of communication channels) is the beauty of Puma!” 
(Sourcing Department) 
The head of Global Marketing also argues that flat hierarchies are beneficial for managing 
corporate legitimacy – 
“I think that the fact that PUMA is not so hierarchical is an advantage as it allows at-
tacking any problems very quickly and easily.” (Head Global Marketing) 
The informality of communication channels and the lack of steep hierarchies for a long time 
almost replaced rigid coordination structures at Puma. Today, the introduction of some formal 
coordination procedures became necessary yet fluid coordination processes prevail. They en-
able the organization to respond quickly to emerging issues and, if necessary, switch to more 
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appropriate legitimacy strategies in a flexible manner (SEPARATE BUT ALIGNED OR-
GANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE). 
The informal mode of exchange at Puma also abets the process of balancing counter-veiling 
processes. All interview partners confirm that thanks to Puma’s open corporate culture there 
are ample occasions to engage in reflexive monitoring processes (BALANCING). Interview 
partners even argued that the issue of potential change requirements is constantly put on the 
agenda and is a permanent theme in organizational discourse (see e.g. interview with Head of 
Marketing).  Puma Vision was created to respond to the need to create an umbrella structure 
for its various social engagements (Puma Safe, Puma Creative, Puma Peace). In 2011, after a 
review of the environmental requirements, the head of Puma Safe realized that the organiza-
tion needs to build up more specific knowledge on environmental issues as well as on social 
issues. Hence, they just recently decided to restructure the S.A.F.E. department and split it in 
two parts, namely Puma Humanities and Puma Environment.  
Puma also installed several platforms that ensure that the corporation is continuously aware of 
environmental trends. The annual stakeholder meeting in Banz, the participation in multi-
stakeholder initiatives (Fair Labor Association, UN Global Compact etc.), the regular ex-
change with civil society organizations, as well as a newly established advisory council that is 
composed of external experts provide the organization with the information that it needs for 
deciding whether or not the current organizational architecture is still able to manage paradox-
ical requirements (BALANCING).  
To conclude, the interview data allowed us to trace the organizational development of Puma 
from 2003 to 2011 and the data shows that Puma’s organizational setting has become more 
ambidextrous over time. Features that are critical for an ambidextrous context were intro-
duced and they continue evolving (e.g. the development of a corporate vision and mission that 
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includes sustainability and the strong commitment of all the functional heads to implement 
this mission and to resolve conflicts as they arise). The organizational architecture includes 
elements that are very focused on their realm yet informal communication processes facilitate 
coordination and alignment with the corporate mission. In addition, several mechanisms were 
installed to ensure that the organizational members regularly and consciously reflect on the 
appropriateness of the organizational design (inter-departmental meetings, advisory board, 
and stakeholder meeting in Banz).  
Summary of Findings and Hypothesis 
In this section, we summarize our findings and formulate propositions. Given Puma’s numer-
ous awards and distinctions, we started our empirical analysis with the assumption that Puma 
presents a data rich case of an organization that successfully manages legitimacy. Therefore, 
we draw the following conclusions for managing legitimacy successfully. 
 The explorative case study shows that Puma has over time increased its repertoire of legiti-
macy strategies. The Matamoros crisis started the dialogue with critical NGOs, a novel ap-
proach for Puma at the time. Through this crisis, the company learnt to also activate argumen-
tation strategies at following crisis points. In the analyzed years, Puma was able to employ all 
three legitimacy strategies at various points in time and in fact even managed to employ dif-
ferent legitimation strategies in parallel. Figure 2 displays Puma’s legitimacy strategies at 
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Figure 2: Evolution of Legitimacy Strategies     Source: Own 
 
Thus, our empirical findings suggest that legitimacy strategies are not exclusive (Lamin and 
Zaheer, 2012; Scherer et al., 2013).  
H1: Corporations that successfully manage corporate legitimacy expand their reper-
toire of legitimacy strategies with increasing stakeholder heterogeneity. 
The activation of a specific legitimacy strategy is not necessarily the result of a conscious 
management decision or agency. We believe that legitimacy strategies can also emerge as a 
consequence of a specific organizational context. 
The analysis of Puma’s legitimation strategies over time has also highlighted the growing 
importance of the argumentation strategy. Increasing tensions in Puma’s stakeholder envi-
ronment rendered the legitimation strategies of manipulation and adaptation in many cases 
unsuccessful and therefore resulted in discursive approaches. This illustrates the theoretical 
arguments of Palazzo and Scherer (2006). 
H2: Corporations that successfully manage corporate legitimacy learn over time to em-
ploy the most appropriate legitimacy strategy in a given context.  
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The results also indicate that the three legitimacy strategies as outlined by Suchman (1995) 
need to be extended to also capture hybrid forms. For example, Puma’s main forum for exer-
cising the argumentation strategy, the annual stakeholder forum, was also used for manipula-
tion strategies (see above). Likewise, regular dialogue with stakeholders also served to absorb 
trends and opinions and it enabled Puma to react even before stakeholders could formulate 
demands. This way of anticipating paradoxes and proactively adapting to some demands that 
will most likely emerge in the future, has for Puma been a successful way of avoiding con-
flict, e.g. in the case of sustainable products. 
H3: Corporations that successfully manage corporate legitimacy engage in communica-
tion with stakeholders not only to engage in argumentation but also to activate adapta-
tion and manipulation strategies.  
In terms of the organizational adjustment to complex stakeholder environments, the case 
study shows that Puma has over time made a number of changes to its organizational struc-
tures and procedures.  
H4: Corporations that successfully manage corporate legitimacy create the organiza-
tional prerequisites that enable the activation of multiple legitimacy strategies. 
To be better prepared for new legitimacy challenges and manage paradox stakeholder de-
mands, organizational subunits as well as individual organizational members often learnt 
through experience with crisis situations to operate ambidextrous. In the process of creating 
the context for ambidexterity at Puma, leadership, open communication channels, and the 
introduction of various organizational reflection mechanisms were crucial. The most remark-
able aspects of this development are (1) the creation of a corporate vision that gives direction 
for all corporate decisions, (2) the creation of several new senior management positions (Head 
Corporate Strategy; Head Puma Vision, as well as a new deputy for the Sourcing Department) 
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to structure and oversee the process of managing legitimacy, (3) the installment of SOPs (e.g. 
regular teleconferences) to coordinate the legitimacy strategies of different departments, (4) 
open, informal communication channels to respond to legitimacy challenges when they arise, 
(5) alignment of incentive structures (HRM management) and specialized training, and (6) the 
establishment of reflective mechanisms (stakeholder meetings, advisory council) in order to 
proactively respond to tensions in the environment and tackle issues when they emerge. These 
structural elements enable the organization to continuously reflect on fluid and rigid organiza-
tional elements, discuss their usefulness, and decide when to learn and adjust (Schreyögg and 
Sydow, 2010: 1258).  
H5: Corporations that successfully manage corporate legitimacy create an ambidex-
trous organizational context (with a focus on leadership, open communication channels 
and reflective mechanisms) to facilitate balancing countervailing processes. 
Limitations of the Case Study  
Our data has a number of limitations. Firstly, the interviews with Puma’s senior management 
revolved around the three pre-selected issues but not all department heads could comment on 
each issue. Some had changed roles within Puma; a few had just recently joined the company; 
others were at the time of crisis not involved in the issues. We tried to find additional inter-
view partners that could comment on all issues but this was not always possible. Hence, our 
records are not complete. However, we believe that this does not affect the quality of our 
study. The main objective of studying crisis points was to remind the interview partners on 
situations that likely caused frictions with stakeholders and other departments and all inter-
view partners were able to comment on how conflicts are typically being handled at Puma. 
Secondly, the interview partners describe the response strategies of their department and the 
handling of conflicts on each pre-selected issues in retrospect, based on their memories of 
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these events. However, with the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, peoples’ 
recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judg-
ments (Hoffrage et al., 2000). This so-called hindsight bias might also affect the interview 
data of this study. After all, Puma managed to largely smooth out interdepartmental conflicts 
and conflicts with stakeholders. With these outcomes in mind, the instances probably appear 
today less challenging than they actually were at the time. For example, the head of Puma 
S.A.F.E. argued that the NGO campaign against Puma in 2004 was already a routine – 
“The Fair Play Campaign was actually not that dramatic. At that time, we had already 
learned our lessons through the Matamoros case!” (Head S.A.F.E. Department) 
In fact, however, the 2004 campaign led to internal reflections about Puma’s business model 
and resulted in major changes in Puma’s sourcing strategy (Interview Sourcing Department). 
The fact that the interview partners are currently embedded in a company context with a very 
strong strategic focus on sustainability (Puma Vision) probably further intensified this bias. 
Puma Vision was launched in 2008 and any interdepartmental conflict that occurred prior to 
this date is now likely to be viewed as rather mild/moderate.  
Thus, given the psychological processes at play when knowing the outcome of an event, it is 
likely that the interviewees describe the interactions with stakeholders and other departments 
as overly harmonious (Hoffrage et al., 2000). Furthermore, it is possible that the interview 
partners, despite of the trustful relationship that we had established with them over years, re-
sponded to our questions in a company protective manner. Some largely denied any major 
conflicts and portrayed the negotiations over how to handle paradoxical demands as non- 
conflictual. For example – 
“The resistance (from other departments) was minimal because the Matamoros case 
showed us that the dialogue is essential.” (Head S.A.F.E. Department) 
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We control for this potential bias by comparing our data gathered in 2011 with a study con-
ducted in 2003 (Baumann, 2003) as well as with statements from external stakeholders 
(Pflitsch, 2009). Thirdly, although we carefully selected a company based on the likelihood 
that its operations are strongly affected by paradoxical stakeholder demands (sensitive con-
sumer goods industry; strong brands image etc.), the stakeholder environment in which Puma 
operates is in fact less heterogeneous than expected. Most remarkably, the investor landscape 
that Puma is dealing with is, according to the head of Puma’s investor relations, very appre-
ciative of Puma’s engagement in sustainability projects. This is rather surprising given the 
large investments that are necessary to run these projects and the short-term success focus of 
most investors. However, Puma’s investor relations environment is dominated by PPR (over 
70% of shares), a group that currently itself heavily invests in constructing a sustainability 
program (PPR Home3). Moreover, Puma’s ex-CEO has just recently become PPR’s Chief 
Sustainability Officer4
  
 and hence Puma enjoys full support for their sustainability engagement 
from the holding company. Nevertheless, despite of Puma’s benevolent ownership structure 
there are still plenty of other potential tensions in the stakeholder environment that need to be 
managed. Therefore, we argue that our corporation under review is still challenged to define 
appropriate response strategies to paradoxical stakeholder demands. 
 
 
3 For more information about PPR’s sustainability program see 
www.ppr.com/en/commitments/ppr-home-long-run 
4  See http://www.ppr.com/en/press/press-releases/jochen-zeitz-reinforce-his-management-
team-puma-and-head-sport-lifestyle-divisi 
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CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The fact that corporations can lose their license to operate is a taken for granted assumption in 
the management literature. However, empirical studies on how corporations perceive and 
manage legitimacy threats in increasingly complex and dynamic environments are scarce. Our 
paper delivers an example of how an organization tries to navigate through the waters of con-
tradictory stakeholder demands, spelling out some organizational preconditions of managing 
legitimacy in globally stretched corporations. Through our empirical case study we explored 
systematically whether and how a corporation that is apparently successful at managing cor-
porate legitimacy is carefully balancing fluid and rigid organizational features by installing 
reflective mechanisms. As suggested by contingency theorists, we captured the perspective of 
each department to take account for the different environments of each organizational func-
tion. Our data shows how corporations that manage legitimacy successfully internally coordi-
nate their response strategies to various stakeholder groups with potentially paradoxical ex-
pectations and the data also shows which organizational features facilitate/hinder this coordi-
nation process. 
Our data suggests multiple avenues for future research. Our explorative study has done the 
groundwork for designing a large-n study. Furthermore, our longitudinal case research could 
contribute to the understanding of how ambidexterity evolves at organizations over time, a 
research gap explicitly highlighted by Raisch and coauthors (2009: 693). The research ques-
tion of this study was not focused on advancing the ambidexterity paradigm but on the under-
standing of how legitimacy is being managed. A new round of data analysis however could 
possibly be used to shed light on the dynamic perspective of the ambidexterity concept.  
Our data also highlights the role of communication in managing legitimacy. Corporate repre-
sentatives use different kinds of language for different types of stakeholders. There is a grow-
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ing body of literature on polyphony as a tool to analyze organizations as discursive spaces 
which are shaped by a multiplicity of voices (see Belova et al., 2008; Kornberger et al., 2006). 
Analyzing how corporate managers ensure the legitimacy of the organization through the lens 
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Appendix 1: Coding Sheet 
CODE EXEMPLARY QUOTES 
ADAPTATION  
 
• As I said in the beginning there is also a benefit from a marketing 
perspective. People are now asking for and buying specifically 
sustainable products. (Adaptation to consumer demands). (Inter-
national Marketing Department) 
• Today is the right point in time and it would have probably also 
been the right point in time 10 years ago, but as you know the 
whole macro-environment was different then. So there were very 
few companies that would have had that vision 10 years ago. To-
day, every single company tries to incorporate sustainability as-
pects in their strategy. (Adaptation to societal trends), (Global 
Strategy Department) 
• You see guys, as long as we don’t change, we will be confronted 
with these issues. (Adaptation to NGOs’ critique), (Global Sourc-
ing Department) 
• Q (Question): Do you see other competitors moving into the same 
direction? 
A (Answer): Yes, they have to. This discussion has now been 
started and there’s no way that our competitors say “No we don’t 
do this!” Because such a message would spread around and no 
one wants to be in the negative news. I think that it will be a joint 
effort sooner or later. (Adaptation to Competitors’ activities), 
(Global Sourcing Department) 
MANIPULATION  
 
• The investors, as they focus on the financials, are critical that our 
CSR or sustainability concepts are costing too much money and 
that it does not translate into direct profits. So, the company is 
wasting money. However, if you convince them that the consum-
ers will prefer to buy our products because we care about sustain-
ability aspects, you speak their language and even they understand 
our strategy. (Manipulation of investor community), (Corporate 
Communications Department) 
• I think that part of the dialogue is also to educate them a little bit 
that the world is not just about labour issues. (Manipulation of 
stakeholders at stakeholder meeting), (CEO and Chairman)  
• Of course, now and then they need a push because for some of 
them this is something completely new. It’s something they have 
never been asked to do. Still, it is amazing what we found out 
about what some suppliers are already doing without having been 
pushed! (Manipulation of suppliers), (Global Sourcing Depart-
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ment) 
• I think that there is a multitude of tactics that we take in terms of 
communicating our vision to our consumers. Obviously, we made 
some major press announcement last year about the 5- year goals 
in terms of reducing our emissions and also the unveiling of the 
Clever Little Bag. We launched a website which is dedicated to 
the Clever Little Bag which talks more in depth about our overall 
sustainability plans. And this is a much more consumer-oriented 
website compared to the PUMAVision site. We also created a 
Facebook site, which takes advantage of our 3 millions fans on 
Facebook. On this site we can also talk about the things that we 
are trying to do in terms of sustainability both in the environ-
mental and the social areas. (Manipulation of consumers), (Inter-
national Marketing Department) 
• Yet I think that raising awareness for sustainability requires an 
education of the customer without talking loudly about PUMA’s 
sustainability. (Manipulation of consumers), (Design Apparel De-
partment) 
• In other words, there was a moment in the sportswear industry 
where there was a lot of criticism being made by NGOs about 
workforce practices. And I think that PUMA had a point with 
PUMA.Safe specifically not to only respond to this criticism, but 
to become proactive and in general deal with issues before the is-
sues arise. (Manipulation of NGO community), (Puma Vision De-
partment) 
ARGUMENTATION • So, we asked for feedback and the feedback was really positive. 
They really liked it, a lot of them were already vegetarians, but 
still there was a huge approval. Just getting them involved by ask-
ing for their opinion was a good way to start the conversation 
about sustainability issues. (Dialogue with employees), (Corporate 
Communications Department) 
• I think that you need to have dialogue in order to understand what 
the critical issues are. If you don’t engage with your critics, you 
will never find out what their point of view is (Dialogue with crit-
ics), (CEO and Chairman) 
• Q: So, are you planning to organize a dialogue over this? 
A: Well we haven’t planned this yet, but it is certainly something 
to consider. On the one hand you always speak to the financial 
community and on the other hand you always speak to the sus-
tainability community and you are always sitting between two 
chairs. So, ideally, you provide a forum. (Dialogue to bridge the 
communication gap between financial community and sustainabil-
ity community), (Global Strategy Department) 
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• Together we identified some key suppliers out of our portfolio. 
And we started talking to them now to figure out how we can ap-
proach fair wages. But this is something new and unfortunately 
there is no easy way in just saying “let’s add 10% and the 10% di-
rectly benefits the worker and everything is fine.” (Dialogue with 
suppliers), (Global Sourcing Department) 
• To get to your point about listening to consumer feedback, we 
have plans to launch a more dynamic and interactive content in 
order to integrate the opinion of consumers. The goal is to start a 
dialogue with them. (Dialogue with consumers), (International 
Marketing Department) 
• Well I think this is about transparency. On a regular basis, besides 
the Talks at Banz, we have meetings with our stakeholders. These 
are very open forums, which are not covered by the press and 
where everybody can discuss openly whatever issues they may 
have. If we would not try to resolve stakeholder conflicts, I am not 
sure what will happen. So, we have to listen to our stakeholders 
and we have to get feedback from them in an honest and open en-
vironment. We also engage them so that they can start understand-
ing each other and that they can see that their agendas might be 




• Also our membership at the Fair Labor Association was one rela-
tively direct outcome of the Banz talks. After one of the Banz 
meetings, in an informal process, we thought about what could be 
done better and then one element was that we need the external 
verification of our efforts to install Safe. So we decided to join the 
FLA (Strategic Intent to build an organization that is able to man-
age heterogeneous stakeholder demands), (Puma Vision Depart-
ment) 
• To credibly establish a new “Living or Fair Wage” label, a multi-
stakeholder initiative would be needed as well as a campaign be-
hind it to educate consumers about what it is. (International Mar-
keting Department) 
• Therefore, we need to be sure that all those different stakeholders 
get served and that we respond to their particular needs. (Puma 
Vision Department) 
• This is a very complex process that we have to go through to try 
in some way to not be diverted from an understanding of a holis-
tic, interconnected way of how we have to fulfil our responsibility 
for each of these groups and how we have to work to try to re-
solve the criticisms from each stakeholder group. (Puma Vision 
Department) 
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• We are becoming increasingly aware of all these different stake-
holder groups and our big challenge is to define a structure or a 
philosophy whereby we can respond to these groups and not com-
promise one against the other. (Puma Vision Department) 
• To summarize our conversation on PUMA’s stakeholder relation-
ship management - I think that there are three particular character-
istics that are driving all of us at Puma. I think the first one is a 
holistic strategy for which an implementation program was 
drafted. In other words, the PUMAVision comes up with a long 
term structured way of how to deal with all the different interest 
groups. The second element is our proactive approach that is sup-
ported by a programmed attitude. (Puma Vision Department) 
VISION & VALUES • I think having values is better than being more strategical or tacti-
cal. (International Marketing Department) 
• The journalists also know that sustainability is dear to PUMA. So 
there is no need to push that anymore but it’s a given that we are 
just doing it. It’s part of our DNA and it’s also part of our com-
pany mission to become the most desirable and sustainable 
sportlifestyle company in the world. (Corporate Communications 
Department) 
• I think that first of all everything starts with a vision and a mis-
sion. If you don’t know what your actual vision is and if you did 
not derive a clear mission from your vision for the business that 
you are in charge of, it’s difficult to determine what you should 
do. So, it all starts with a vision and a mission. (CEO and Chair-
main) 
• So, I think everybody knows about the vision but not everyone is 




• But, in general, PUMA is pretty strict in this respect. If you ha-
ven’t met the targets, you haven’t met the targets – full stop! And 
you don’t get a bonus. (Human Resources) 
• No, it’s actually a good portion of the salary. The good thing is 
that, when we introduced this criterion last year consistently 
across the world, I actually did not feel much resistance on the 
GM (General Management) level. Most people asked “well what’s 
the target?” (Human Resources) 
• But it’s quite important to keep working driving the sustainability 
targets through the entire organization. We are in the middle of a 
change management process. So, penetration is key. We have to 
use any chance possible to communicate to our people and to tell 
them the story and explain what stands behind it. (Human Re-
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sources) 
• It was an interesting discussion, because it’s about how to achieve 
penetration. It is not just about sending out e-mails but you have 
to use all kinds of methods. Sustainability should become an es-
sential part of leadership trainings, and it should as well be inte-
grated further in the on-boarding training; it should be a part of all 
communications and it should be part of team meetings in order to 
regularly check if we are indeed achieving our sustainability tar-
gets. (Human Resources) 
• Exactly. It’s a broader system and this is the only way we can 
make people accountable for something and make sure they drive 
proactively. When it comes to sourcing, you have to be a bit dicta-
torial, I must say. Otherwise nothing is going to happen! (Global 
Strategy Department) 
• You cannot always listen to that. Sometimes, especially in my po-
sition and in Jochen’s position, you have to take a few dictatorial 
decisions to make things happen and I just gave you one of those 
examples where we did that! (Global Strategy Department) 
• There is no ultimate recipe but I believe that it really starts with a 
strong vision and very strong CEO leadership. That’s key! If that 
is not happening, forget about it! Someone will perhaps start a fire 
somewhere but no one will care about it. So, strong leadership 
from the CEO and then cascading down further into the different 
parts of the organization is absolutely key to drive such a vision 
top-down. (Global Strategy Department) 
• Q: Are there very strict guidelines for your team on how to handle 
these things? 
A: Well the goal is clear! The last three days, we had a strategy 
meeting with the board and I think the goals have again been 
clearly pointed out by Jochen Zeitz, which is of course very chal-
lenging for us, but nevertheless I think that we have to start 
somewhere. (Global Sourcing Department) 
• First of all, the internal staff. You cannot distribute a message to 
someone externally, if the message has not yet been fully incorpo-
rated in our own DNA. There is still some work to do. (Puma 
S.A.F.E. Department) 
• Q: What triggered the change of pace that took place three and a 
half years ago? 
A: From what I understand, this was the initiative of the CEO at 
the time, Mr. Jochen Zeitz. I think our engagement can to a large 
extent be attributed to a very personal passion of our CEO and he 
became increasingly aware of the need to consider these things. 
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• The board wanted the group to start thinking about sustainability 
in a broader way, not only in the supply chain way. And therefore 
the product divisions were involved as well as other departments 
like the logistics department or the retail department. So Franz 
collected all the information from the different functional heads 
and decision makers within PUMA. (Puma S.A.F.E. Department) 
• Sustainability targets in the bonus structure of senior decision 
makers, like having all parts of the organization reporting on sus-
tainability to one central person high up in the hierarchy, or in-
creasing the sustainability communication to the consumer. (Puma 
S.A.F.E. Department) 
• So every three months there is, what we call, the 360 sustainabil-
ity conference with all the departments to see the progress. And, 
once a month, there is an executive sustainability call with obvi-
ously our CEO, our CMO, our CFO, head of retail, head of strate-
gic planning, director of PUMAVision and the head of 
PUMA.Safe, where we talk about top-line and long-term projects 
on a monthly basis. (International Marketing Department) 
• So, the implications of our sustainability vision must be clearly 
understood by the design department, the material people but also 
by other people in the company. We are talking here about the 
whole picture, beyond making new products. (Puma S.A.F.E. De-
partment) 
• One thing, for example, is that we will split PUMA.Safe into 
PUMA.Safe Humanity and PUMA.Safe Ecology. We will have 
two legs focusing on different topics because we figured out that 
we can’t do everything at once. This is also in line with PPR’s ap-
proach. (Puma S.A.F.E. Department) 
• We have grown into a team of 15 people, but I cannot expect that 
everybody has all the necessary knowledge in all areas. So it is 
better to have one leg concentrating on A and another leg concen-
trating on B. Yet, there will be frequent exchanges between these 
groups to ensure the balance between those two areas. (Puma 
S.A.F.E. Department) 
• I’d like to call it responsibility for our environment, we split it into 
different areas: we have the product area, retail area, marketing 
area and the logistics area. In my function, I am only talking about 
the product area. PUMA developed a so-called S-Index that in-
forms and educates our designers as well as our development peo-
ple about materials and yarns that help PUMA to become more 
sustainable. (Design Apparel Department) 
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• PUMA has done some restructuring and Jochen Zeitz is now the 
Chief Sustainability Officer on the group level of PPR and Franz 
Koch is taking over the CEO role. PUMAVision will however 
continue reporting to Jochen Zeitz, because he will be the chief 




• Yes, we certainly had problems in the past. We still have a few 
problems. But I would say that sourcing and Safe are now on a 
similar track. (Puma S.A.F.E. Department) 
• This process is always a give and take. But I would say that these 
are discussions, not fights because it is not that one department 
has an objective and the other department has another. (Design 
Apparel Department)  
BALANCING • We have still a long way to go to also get organized internally. I 
think that the questions that you raised are valid and from a proc-
ess perspective not yet totally nailed down for all the departments. 
We have to be honest; many things need to be better organized in-
ternally. (Investor Relations Department) 
• I have made the experience that there is always a balance that you 
have to take into account because at the beginning you are trying 
to push the messages by explaining over and over again what 
PUMAVision is about. After a while, people get a bit tired and 
they say “is now everybody turning green?” There was this kind 
of criticism and we realized that we need to communicate differ-
ently to get employees engaged. (Corporate Communications De-
partment) 
• But the challenge is to find a balance between being profitable and 
sustainable. (Human Resources)  
• But since you mention challenges - one of the challenges that we 
are constantly facing is how to manage the dialogue with both the 
financial world and the CSR world. How can both worlds come 
together at some point in time. (Global Strategy Department) 
• A sourcing decision always depends on a combination of factors: 
quality, lead time, flexibility as well as social responsibility. CSR 
is a fully established criterion these days, which is good. And that 
only happened, I think, in the last five to six years. (Global Sourc-
ing Department) 
• I think both sides – sourcing and Safe – made suggestions for im-
provements and then finally all came together. So the very close 
communication between us and the sourcing team was essential in 
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this respect. (Puma S.A.F.E. Department) 
• But the key question is how to on the one hand cope with the cost 
pressure while not reducing the margins, and on the other hand the 
idea that wages should be increasing. (Puma S.A.F.E. Depart-
ment) 
• But the way we approached it, is to try to speak to our consumers 
in the appropriate language - using phrases, a terminology and 
iconography that they can relate to easily and already expect from 
our brand. (International Marketing Department) 
• Once we have the results, we need of course to sit at a table and 
see what the next step should be. As you know, one cannot pay 
fair wages over night! Many other parameters have to be adjusted 
for doing so. (Puma S.A.F.E. Department) 
• We need to start with sustainable fabrics, then we would probably 
cut down elements in the design that would increase the pricing. 
So, in other words, we are trying to achieve our goals by also re-
thinking design. In the end, it doesn’t necessarily need to result in 
less interesting products. 
Q: Do you have to make trade-offs sometimes? 
A: No! Well, to be honest, sometimes yes…sometimes we need to 
see “ok, what are we doing now?” (Design Apparel Department) 
 
 
 
 
 
